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INTRODUCTION 
In Fall 2007, the demise of Lehman Brothers and the near collapse 
and rescue of numerous other financial institutions thought too big to fail 
dramatically signaled a new era of financial regulation. Americans call 
the event the Great Recession, evidence of the American belief that it 
happened “to us.” The rest of the world refers to it as the GFC, the Global 
Financial Crisis, reflecting the reality that the collapse affected the entire 
world. Countries around the world scrambled to establish legal controls 
that could stem the damage. The U.S. response was to enact in 2010 the 
Dodd-Frank Act, a multifaceted package of financial reforms that 
included sweeping changes to the regulation of consumer credit.1 Though 
not nearly as badly harmed by the GFC as the United States,2 Australia 
passed two new large consumer financial laws: The Australian Consumer 
Law,3 and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act.4 
Among the significant legal changes, for the first time both countries 
have departed from the prized common law freedom of contract by 
imposing constraints on a creditor’s decision to grant credit to a 
borrower.5 In essence, both nations sought to alter the culture of the 
consumer-credit industry, yet they have taken significantly different 
approaches to the challenge of regulating credit-granting decisions. By 
looking at the two approaches and the processes that led to the changes, 
                                                                                                                     
*   Gerald A. Sohn Research Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin 
College of Law. 
 1.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Title 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5301, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Sat. 1376 (2010). 
 2.  Australia experienced only a -.9% fall in GDP in the December quarter of 2008, and 
experienced no other drop in GDP during the recession. Chris Barrett, Australia and the Great 
Recession, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS (Apr. 2011), http://www. 
wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Australia%20and%20the%20Great%20Recession.pdf. 
 3.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (2010) (Austl.) (replacing the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) sch. 2 (1974) (Austl.)). 
 4.  National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (2009) (Austl.) [hereinafter 
Credit Act 2009]. 
 5.  Karen Cox, Consumer Credit, HOT TOPICS (Mar. 1, 2015, 11:49 PM), 
http://www.legalanswers.sl.nsw.gov.au/hot_topics/pdf/consumer_credit.pdf. Strictly speaking, 
under Section 70(1) of the Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1996), among the 
numerous factors a court could consider in determining in its discretion whether a contract was 
unjust was whether at the time the contract was entered the creditor knew or could have 
ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the debtor could not pay without substantial hardship. 
Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code 1996 § 70(1). This inquiry did not operate as an 
express limitation on contracting, but served merely as one of a number of factors to be considered 
in enforcement. Id. 
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there is much to be learned about the challenges faced, the choices made, 
and the reasons for the differences in the choices made by these two 
democratic nations. It may also be possible to speculate as to the 
likelihood of success in changing the culture of the consumer credit 
industries of these two nations that so highly prize individual liberty. 
The Australian approach to regulating the decision to grant consumer 
credit differs systematically from that in the United States. First, Australia 
requires responsible credit granting in all forms of consumer credit, 
whereas the United States thus far constrains the decision only in the 
narrow realms of home mortgage lending, credit cards, and military 
payday loans. Second, the American concept of responsible consumer 
lending requires only an assessment of the debtor’s ability to pay, 
whereas the Australian concept requires a determination of whether the 
credit is “suitable,” requiring not only an assessment of the consumer’s 
likely ability to pay, but also an inquiry into the consumer’s requirements 
and objectives in borrowing. Third, Australia requires anyone engaging 
in consumer credit activity to obtain a credit license. While most 
American states require licenses to engage in certain types of consumer 
credit, such as becoming a mortgage broker, there is no such general 
requirement in any state, and the federal government makes no such 
requirement at all. Fourth, Australia alone provides a process that is 
unique in the world for External Dispute Resolution that is cost-free to 
the consumer. 
In this Article, I discuss the changes in three consumer-credit realms. 
First, I compare the Australian regime applicable to all forms of consumer 
credit granting, including mortgage lending, to the American regulation 
of the consumer mortgage-granting decision. Second, I compare the 
Australian and American approaches to the decision to authorize use of, 
or increase the credit limit on, individual credit cards. Third, I compare 
the two approaches to regulating small short-term loans, usually called 
payday loans. Finally, I compare the enforcement regimes of both 
countries—perhaps the key to it all. 
If a government intends to regulate transactional behavior, there are 
two fundamentally different approaches to doing so. One is to state in 
general terms what type of conduct is (or is not) permitted. The other is 
to extensively define in very precise terms what conduct is (or is not) 
permitted. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. The first approach is to 
state in broad terms the societal values to be adhered to or the overall 
results to be achieved. It has the virtue that parties engaging in 
transactions within the scope of the regulation will find it more difficult 
to avoid through cleverness of tactic. One’s conduct either complies with 
the broad mandate or fails to comply. The problem with its imprecision 
lies in assuring its effectiveness. Some third party in authority must 
exercise judgment in determining whether the conduct of the parties at 
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hand fits within the range of permissible practices that fall within the 
regulation’s scope. Even if the parties have attempted in good faith to 
comply, their own judgment cannot be determinative.  
The third party whose judgment controls may be a court or regulatory 
agency, and the effectiveness of the regulation will then depend on a 
litigation model, which counts on the parties to bring the issue of 
compliance to the attention of the tribunal through some dispute 
resolution process. Once the judgment is exercised, determining that the 
conduct is non-compliant, the imposition of a remedy will be the final 
step in ensuring effectiveness of the regulation. If this process is utilized 
with sufficient frequency and notoriety, persons engaging in the regulated 
conduct can be expected to begin to understand more clearly what kinds 
of conduct are permitted, what kinds are not, and to mold their conduct 
accordingly. If a high proportion of these parties comply, the regulation 
will have been successful.  
Quite obviously, the decision to take this approach depends on a clear 
determination that the conduct needs to be regulated due to the frequency 
of impermissible conduct and that some aspect of society will be better 
off if such conduct is curtailed. But the pathway to curtailment is a fitful 
one. The litigation model depends on the parties to bring the issue to the 
tribunal. The exercise of judgment by the tribunal may require the 
production of complex evidence, and may require difficult choices among 
the genuine interests of the parties. 
If the second approach to regulation is taken, defining extensively and 
precisely what types of conduct are required and what types are 
prohibited, the litigation model operates more easily because it does not 
depend as much on the exercise of the tribunal’s judgment. Once the 
dispute is brought to the attention of the tribunal, it is a rather 
straightforward matter to determine whether the parties’ conduct has 
conformed to the precise requirements of the regulation or not. The 
appropriate remedy can then be applied. Moreover, because of the 
precision of the regulation, the parties to the dispute can more readily 
predict the result, increasing the likelihood that the dispute will be settled 
and litigation avoided. 
If the first approach to regulation is taken, defining the prohibited 
conduct broadly, the better enforcement approach is to rely primarily on 
licensing of the parties engaged in the commercial conduct. The licensing 
agency becomes the third party that exercises judgment as to whether 
there has been compliance with the broad language of the regulation. The 
incentive to conform one’s conduct to the regulation is driven by the 
threat of loss of the license. The effectiveness of the regulation turns then 
on the extensiveness and reliability of the licensing agency, which may 
require a significant commitment of public funds.  
As to the American and the Australian approaches to the regulation of 
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the credit-granting decision, the two nations have taken opposite 
approaches. The Australian regulatory standards are stated quite broadly, 
and Australia depends extensively on licensing as the key to enforcing 
the standards. Anyone who extends consumer credit in Australia must be 
licensed to do so, and anyone who assists in or facilitates an extension of 
credit must also be licensed. In contrast, in America, the standards for 
compliance are extremely detailed, minimizing the exercise of third party 
judgment, and placing heavy reliance on the litigation model. 
I. COMPARING AMERICAN REGULATION OF HOME MORTGAGE 
CREDIT GRANTING TO AUSTRALIAN REGULATION OF ALL CONSUMER 
CREDIT GRANTING 
The most extensive example of American regulation of the credit 
granting decision appears in the home mortgage arena, whereas Australia 
has chosen to regulate the decision in all realms of consumer credit. 
Because both approaches are far-reaching, they can be meaningfully 
compared. The comparison must begin with the genesis of the changes.  
A. The American Approach 
Clearly, the impetus for the American changes was rooted in the 
causes of the GFC. While there were many causes of the GFC, the 
primary cause was the collapse of the American home mortgage market. 
The first steps to the GFC were taken in the 1990s when Wall Street 
discovered home mortgages.6 More precisely, Wall Street discovered that 
mortgages could be bundled together in groups of thousands, and sold as 
a package to investors looking for safe but remunerative investments. The 
process came to be called “securitization,” and the result was the creation 
of mortgage-backed securities. These securities could be sold in 
“tranches” (French for slice), each tranche priced according to appraised 
risk. The key to creating a market for these securities was development 
of a formula published in 2000 by Chinese mathematician David X. Li 
while working at J.P. Morgan Chase.7 The formula provided a simplified 
method for assessing the risk of default of a tranche of mortgages. Rather 
than looking at the risk of default on each of the mortgages and assessing 
the sum of the combined risks, one needed only to apply the formula. In 
doing so, some tranches of these securities were judged to be virtually 
                                                                                                                     
 6.  I well recall a conversation I had in the 1990s with a Miami Real Property lawyer. He 
said, “When Wall Street discovered home mortgages, my practice went crazy.” 
 7.  Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed Wall Street, WIRED (Feb. 
23, 2009), http://archive.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/wp_quant?currentPage=all. 
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risk free by the rating agencies.8 Thinking “jackpot,” as in who would not 
want to invest in a risk-free security, financial institutions all over the 
world began pouring billions into these magical securities. The only 
problem with this astonishing development was that as applied, the banks 
and rating agencies made a commonly held but fatally flawed 
assumption: The value of residential real estate would never decline.9 
Sadly, the devastating flaw in this assumption did not appear until it was 
too late: the damage was done. 
As billions of dollars flowed from all corners into the American home 
mortgage market, home prices rose steadily. With a virtually unlimited 
supply of mortgage money looking for borrowers, intermediaries, such as 
mortgage companies, mortgage brokers and banks searched high and low 
for potential borrowers. They sought not only borrowers seeking to buy, 
but also borrowers seeking to refinance their increasingly valuable 
existing homes, “taking out equity” to be applied to other purposes. These 
intermediaries are not true creditors in any sense. Although mortgage 
companies, banks, savings and loans, and credit unions may write a check 
initially, they would immediately sell the note and mortgage to the entity 
bundling the mortgages into securities, and take a fee. For these 
intermediaries, every approved mortgage application represented a fee. 
As the search for borrowers intensified, standards for creditworthiness 
fell. 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau describes the collapse of 
the mortgage market as follows: 
A primary cause of the collapse was a steady deterioration of credit 
standards in mortgage lending. Evidence demonstrates that many 
mortgage loans were made solely against collateral and without 
consideration of ability to repay, particularly in markets for 
“subprime” and “Alt-A” products, which more than doubled from 
$400 billion in originations in 2003 to $830 billion in originations 
in 2006. Subprime products were sold primarily to consumers with 
poor or no credit history, while Alt-A loans were sold primarily to 
consumers who provided little or no documentation of income or 
other evidence of repayment ability.  
                                                                                                                     
 8.  Everyone “from bond investors and Wall Street banks to rating agencies and 
regulators” adopted this method. Id. 
 9.  See id. More precisely, the formula assumed the correlation among defaults in a pool 
was constant, and bankers securitizing mortgages were only too happy to draw their correlation 
data from the recent past in which real estate values only went up, defaults were uniformly rare, 
and correlation constant. See id. The bankers knew their models were highly sensitive to housing 
price appreciation, and that if it ever turned negative on a national scale, a lot of bonds rated as 
risk-free would blow up. Id. But because they were making so much money no one was willing 
to stop. See id. 
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 When housing prices began to decline in 2005, . . . refinancing 
became more difficult and delinquency rates on subprime and Alt-
A products increased dramatically. By the summer of 2006, 1.5 
percent of loans less than a year old were in default, and this figure 
peaked at 2.5 percent in late 2007. As the economy worsened, the 
rates of serious delinquency (90 or more days past due or in 
foreclosure) for the subprime or Alt-A products began a steep 
increase from approximately 10 percent in 2006 to 20 percent in 
2007, to over 40 percent in 2010.10 
The misdeeds of intermediaries were hardly limited to providing little 
or no documentation. Frequently they engaged in outright fraud. The 
Bureau states that lenders sometimes steered borrowers who could have 
qualified for prime credit to subprime mortgages, which carried higher 
fees.11 There were many instances of applications leading to what have 
been called “liar loans” that openly misstated income figures and other 
information related to credit worthiness.12 
Obviously, under the circumstances existing at the time, a very high 
proportion of the persons making the decisions to grant mortgage credit 
had no stake whatsoever in the likelihood of repayment. There is no 
economic theory in which a person making a business decision has no 
stake in the risk involved. The key to the freedom-of-contract premise is 
that the parties to the agreement should be free to make their own 
assessments of the risks and benefits entailed in the agreed exchange. 
Where market circumstances divorce the credit-granting decision from 
the risk of default, the justification for freedom to make the decision is 
lost. Some other constraint on the decision-making process is needed. 
Enter Dodd-Frank, and the charge to the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau to depart from the previously inviolate freedom-of-contract 
model and instead to regulate the decision to make a loan secured by a 
                                                                                                                     
 10.  Ability–to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 35,429, 35,431 (June 12, 2013) (citations omitted) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
 11.  Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Press Release (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20110720a.htm. The Bureau 
describes the consent cease and desist order entered on this ground between the Federal Reserve 
and Wells Fargo & Co., which resulted in a civil penalty of $85 Million. Id. 
 12.  See, e.g., In re Hill, 2008 WL 2227359 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008). In that case, 
homeowners repeatedly refinanced their home, fraudulently filling out numerous loan 
applications. Id. The loans were treated as “stated income loans,” which did not require 
verification of income. Id. at 1 In two examples of the fraud, on the April 2006, loan application, 
the husband’s income was stated as $98,112 and the wife’s income as $47,604. Id. at 1. On the 
October application, the incomes were switched, the husband’s income was stated as $67,200, 
and the wife’s as $123,600. Id. at 5. True incomes were: Husband’s $39,000 and wife’s $26,000. 
Id. at 1. 
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home mortgage. 
B. Departing From Freedom of Contract 
One of the most fundamental concepts in the civil law of the United 
States and commonwealth countries is the commitment to freedom of 
contract. The premise is that, absent some invalidating cause such as 
mistake, fraud, duress, illegality, incompetence, or infancy, all persons, 
individuals and entities, are empowered to arrive at agreements as they 
see fit. The parties to any agreement are presumed capable of weighing 
for themselves the benefits and detriments of an agreed exchange. To be 
enforceable, a promise must be supported by consideration or some 
substitute for it, but the requirement can be satisfied regardless of the 
relative values of the things exchanged.13 Accordingly, aside from usury 
laws, the decision to extend credit has not traditionally been regulated. 
Borrowers have been permitted to enforceably agree to pay any price for 
the right to use borrowed money.  
Regulation of consumer credit contracts is a relatively new enterprise, 
because consumer credit is a relatively new enterprise. Aside from 
mortgage lending, there was virtually no consumer credit until the 1950s. 
Previously, if a person or family wanted something, they had to save-up 
the purchase price. Following World War II, families began acquiring 
automobiles and household goods on credit. The business grew 
phenomenally;14 new forms of consumer borrowing came into being, 
evolving from closed-end loans to revolving credit to credit cards and 
small loan companies. 
By the mid-sixties, it became apparent that there were so many 
unregulated forms of consumer credit that the opportunities to take unfair 
advantage of consumer borrowers were nearly limitless. Inevitably, 
where an advantage–taking opportunity arises, opportunists will appear. 
The idea of an opportunistic credit grantor is a curious one. At first blush, 
it would appear that the creditor is the one taking on risk—the possibility 
of going unpaid. However, by making prudent credit-granting decisions, 
and with the help of contract remedial law, the creditor could by 
contracting in bulk, shift those risks to its favor. 
The first, most obvious loss avoidance practice is to make careful 
                                                                                                                     
 13.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981). 
 14.  For example, “From the end of World War II through 1967 the amount of such credit 
outstanding had increased from $5.6 billion to $95.9 billion, a rate of growth more than 4½ times 
as great as that of the economy.” Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 
(1973). In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator Paul Douglas, father of the Truth in Lending Act, 
stated, “Since the end of World War II mortgage credit has increased almost six times from $18.6 
billion in 1945 to $140 billion in 1960. Consumer Credit has increased more than eightfold—from 
less than $6 billion in 1945 to $55 billion by the end of 1960.” 107 CONG. REC. S7859 (daily ed. 
May 11, 1961) (statement of Sen. Douglas).  
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credit granting decisions—extending credit only to those highly unlikely 
to default. The creditor seeking to expand has the choice of making riskier 
credit granting decisions if the increased default losses can be balanced 
by charging higher interest rates. Another balancing device is collection 
of additional sorts of fees, such as late-payment fees, credit insurance 
premiums, penalties for paying a loan off early, and the like. All of these 
techniques became common. So, by the mid-sixties, the awareness grew 
in the United States that the consumer credit industry needed to be reined 
in. But how? Contract law is state law, and the fifty states had done little 
here. Since the bulk of significant consumer-credit companies operated 
nationally, the piecemeal threat of state-to-state regulation was not likely 
to effect the needed constraints. Any attempt to control the substantive 
content of a consumer credit contract ran afoul of the highly prized 
freedom to contract. The freedom of the hypothetical consumer to 
contract for the optimum combination of rates and terms would be totally 
lost, as would be the creditor’s freedom to extend credit only on terms 
satisfactory to it. 
The discussion began at the federal level by Senator Paul Douglas, an 
economics professor turned Senator from Illinois. It was clear to him that 
different types of consumer creditors stated interest rates in so many 
different ways that only the most sophisticated consumers could compare 
one effective rate to another in order to shop for the best deal.15 Freedom 
to contract by making one’s own assessment of benefits and risks has no 
utility if the information needed to make the assessment is lacking, or 
worse, hidden from the ordinary consumer. 
Rather than interfere with the prized freedom of both creditor and 
consumer to bargain for their desired terms, the focus shifted to 
improving the bargaining process through required disclosures. The 
belief was that if the consumer can be provided the needed information 
in an understandable format, comparison shopping would be possible. 
Once consumers began to shop, not only for interest rate, but also for 
terms, it was hoped the competition in the marketplace would drive out 
the unfair terms, charges, and excessive rates. 
In at least one respect, the Truth-in-Lending Act has been an 
extraordinary success. By requiring that interest rates be uniformly stated 
in terms of Annual Percentage Rate (APR), the ability of consumers to 
compare rates was assured. Today, consumer creditors often compete 
                                                                                                                     
 15.  For example, in his remarks vigorously defending S 1740, the Truth in Lending Act, 
which he had introduced, Senator Douglas quoted the testimony of Dr. Theodore O. Yntema, vice 
president in charge of finance, Ford Motor Co, stating: “The variety and complexity of finance 
and insurance arrangements and the charges for them are such as almost to defy comprehension. 
It is impossible for the average buyer to appreciate the rates for the finance . . . offered as compared 
with alternatives available to them elsewhere.” 107 CONG. REC. S7856 (daily ed. May 11, 1961) 
(statement of Sen. Douglas).  
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openly on the basis of APR, and most consumers probably understand 
what it means. Whether consumers shop for other sorts of terms, such as 
default rates or prepayment penalties is far less clear. However, one more 
thing is clear. Even if the consumer and creditor both fully understand 
what is the APR to be charged, and even if it is the lowest interest rate 
likely to be available to the particular consumer in such a transaction, it 
was left solely to the consumer borrower to assess whether (s)he would 
be able to make the payments, or whether, under the circumstances, the 
decision to borrow the money and the purpose of the loan makes good 
sense.  
How quaint. 
C. The New American Rule 
The Dodd-Frank Act created the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (Bureau), added Section 129B to the Truth In Lending Act 
(TILA),16 and authorized the Bureau to take over responsibility for Truth 
In Lending’s Regulation Z. On June 12, 2013, the Bureau issued the final 
rule to adopt certain exemptions, modifications, and clarifications to the 
ability-to-repay rule added to the TILA by the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
Dodd-Frank Act now generally requires creditors to make a reasonable 
good faith determination of a consumer’s ability to repay a mortgage 
loan.17 The scope of this requirement is narrow, applying only to a 
consumer credit transaction that is secured by a dwelling.18 The required 
basis for making this determination is regulated in great detail, requiring 
the creditor explicitly to consider eight factors: expected income or 
assets; employment status; payments on the transaction; payments on any 
simultaneous loan; payments on mortgage-related obligations; other debt 
obligations (alimony, support); monthly debt to income ratio; and credit 
history.19 Payments on the transaction must be calculated using the 
greater of the fully indexed rate or any introductory rate,20 and 
consideration of any of these factors based on third-party records must be 
verified.21 The regulation also provides detailed guides as to what 
adequate verification must entail.22 
                                                                                                                     
 16.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 1411, 1412, 1414, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301 (2010)). 
 17.  Truth in Lending (Regulation Z) 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c) (2014). 
 18.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(a). This subsection lists numerous excepted transactions, 
including home equity loans, bridge loans, certain construction loans, and extensions of credit 
made or facilitated by certain governmental and tax-exempt entities. Id.  
 19.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2). 
 20.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(5). Calculated payments must also be fully amortizing and 
substantially equal. Id.  
 21.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(3). 
 22.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(3)&(4). 
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The burden of carefuLly taking and documenting all of these steps for 
every mortgage loan would be substantial, if not daunting, and the 
increased cost would have to be passed along to the borrower. 
Accordingly, the Act provides a large escape hatch, called the “safe 
harbor,” and by controlling the entrance to the safe harbor the Act 
regulates not only the credit granting decision, but also the substantive 
content (the terms) of future mortgages on dwellings.23 One enters the 
safe harbor by executing a “Qualified Mortgage.”24  
There are two levels of Qualified Mortgages. The highest secures a 
loan that is not a “higher-priced” loan.25 These automatically comply with 
the repayment ability requirements.26 A lower level qualified mortgage is 
one that secures a higher-priced loan. It occupies a less-safe place in the 
harbor; it is presumed to comply with the repayment ability 
requirements.27 This presumption is still a significant boon to the 
mortgagee, because the regulation states at length what must be proved 
to rebut the presumption—clearly no mean feat.28 Yet, the absolute 
protection against litigation that comes with a safest-harbor loan (one that 
is not higher-priced) provides significant incentive to the creditor to be 
sure to qualify for this top-level protection. 
While the requirements for a mortgage to be Qualified are numerous, 
most of the requirements are easily met.29 Oddly, there is no explicit 
                                                                                                                     
 23.  See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 29 (describing the terms required to be included 
in a qualified mortgage securing a higher-priced loan under 12 C.F.R. 1026.43(e)(2)). 
 24.  12 C.F.R 1026.43(e)(1)(i). Years ago, I wrote an article recommending standardization 
of the terms of consumer-credit contracts. Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract 
Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333 (1982). In effect, the terms of future “qualified” dwelling mortgages, 
will now be highly standardized. 
 25.  A higher-priced mortgage loan is one with an annual percentage rate that exceeds the 
average prime offer rate (APOR) by 1.5% for a first lien or by 3.5% for a subordinate lien. 12 
C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(4). APOR is derived from average loan rates for low-risk mortgage 
transactions derived from surveys and published on the internet. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.35(a)(1) (2014). 
 26.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i) (2014). 
 27.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(A). 
 28.  To rebut the presumption, the opponent of the mortgagee must show that the 
consumer’s income and expenses, known to the creditor, would leave the consumer with 
insufficient residual income or assets with which to meet living expenses, including residual non-
debt obligations of which the creditor was aware at the time of consummation. 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.43(e)(ii)(B). 
 29.  First, the mortgage must secure a “covered transaction,” meaning simply a consumer 
credit transaction secured by dwelling. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(1). The definition of 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.43(e)(2) states that it must provide for periodic payments that do not increase the principal 
balance, allow for deferred principal repayment or result in a balloon payment (with exceptions), 
the loan term must not exceed 30 years, and the total points and fees may not exceed specified 
limits. The monthly payments must retire the principal over the term of the loan. 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.43(e)(iv)(B). The creditor must verify the debtor’s income, assets other than the dwelling, 
current debt and other obligations, and the ratio of the consumer’s total monthly debt to total 
monthly income at the time of consumption must not exceed 43%. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(v)–
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requirement that the creditor consider ability to repay. However, the 
Qualified mortgagee must “take into account” the monthly payment for 
mortgage-related obligations,30 must verify at or before consummation 
the consumer’s current income or assets (other than the dwelling)31 and 
current debt obligations,32 and the ratio of “monthly debt” to monthly 
income must not exceed 43%.33 In essence, taking these totals into 
account in calculating this ratio supplants the requirement of considering 
ability to repay as long as the debt-to-income ratio does not exceed 43%. 
The creditor need only make a mechanical calculation, and is relieved of 
any obligation to exercise judgment. If the ratio exceeds 43%, the creditor 
must decide whether to deny the loan, or to determine ability to repay.34 
The most controversial of the requirements for Qualification is that 
points and fees, including payments to loan originators, cannot exceed 
the amounts specified in § 1026.43(e)(3).35 Experience had shown that 
the intermediaries who originated the bulk of mortgage loans were 
focused on collecting fees to the exclusion of careful risk assessment. 
Because this reality had played such a significant role in destabilizing the 
housing market, the belief underlying the Dodd-Frank Act is that these 
motives must be reined in by controlling these fees. The Bureau received 
1,150 comments in response to the proposed rule, many of them focusing 
on the calculation of loan originator compensation for inclusion in points 
and fees for the qualified mortgage and high-cost mortgage points and 
fees limits.36 The comments received by the Bureau spawned a number 
of narrow exclusions.37 Clearly, the intermediaries have no interest in 
                                                                                                                     
(vi).  
 30.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv). This amount must include either the maximum interest 
rate that might apply or an amount that will repay the loan amount over the loan term. Id. 
 31.  12 C.F.R § 1026.43(e)(2)(v)(A). 
 32.  12 C.F.R § 1026.43(e)(2)(v)(B). 
 33.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi). What might “monthly debt” mean? Presumably it means 
monthly payment obligation on debt obligations, alimony, support, and the like.  
 34.  It will be interesting to see how the case law evolves. It would be no surprise if ratios 
in excess of 43% begin to operate as an informal presumption of inability to repay. 
 35.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(3). The limits vary depending on the size of the loan, as follows: 
 Greater or equal to 
 $100,000   Limit = 3% of total loan 
 $60,000 t0 $100,000 Limit = $3,000 
 $20,000 to $60,000 Limit = 5% of total loan 
 $12,500 to $20,000 Limit = $1,000 
 Less than $12,000 Limit = 8% of total loan 
All specified dollar amounts will be indexed for inflation. 
 36.  Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth In Lending Act 
(Regulation Z) 78 Fed. Reg. 35,429, 35,440 (June 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).  
 37.  In recognition of the deep difficulty of tracking payments to loan-originator employees, 
payments from consumers and creditors to brokers, the risks of double counting, and possible 
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limiting their own fees, and the threat of an enforcement action against 
such an intermediary is ephemeral at best. It is by inclusion of these fee 
limits in the definition of Qualified Mortgage that the lender is guaranteed 
to have a stake in assuring that the fees do not exceed the specified limits 
as a key to entering the safe harbor. Like it or not, the statute has cleverly 
enlisted the lenders in the policing of intermediary fees. 
D. The New Australian Rule 
Although the Australian and American laws regulating the credit-
granting decision were enacted nearly simultaneously, they arrived by 
very different routes. The Australian act was not a reaction to the GFC. 
The Australian National Consumer Credit Act (Credit Act) followed in 
the footsteps of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), which was 
the previous statute regulating consumer credit providers. In the run-up 
to the implementation of the Credit Act, it was found by various 
legislative bodies, and task forces found that the UCCC had gaping holes 
that needed to be addressed.38 Specifically, it was perceived as 
problematic that the UCCC only regulated disclosure and permissible 
terms, and that it “does not comprehensively address the appropriateness 
of the initial provision of the credit to the consumer. That is to say, it does 
not regulate whether or not it was responsible to lend to the consumer in 
the first place.”39 The Credit Act was passed to add front-end regulation 
to the regulatory scheme, to ensure that the regulations did not cover only 
those circumstances that occurred after an irresponsible loan was 
originally made.40 
The national agency primarily responsible for regulating Australian 
consumer credit is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC). In 2003, ASIC released a report on the finance and mortgage 
broker industries. In that report, ASIC detailed the existing problems with 
Australia’s regulation of those industries—namely, that it was a state-
based unreliable patchwork, and provided barely any protection in 
important areas.41 ASIC found the industry suffered from a number of 
                                                                                                                     
constraints on mortgage availability, the final rule recognizes three exclusions: loan originator 
compensation paid by a consumer to a mortgage broker when the payment has already been 
counted toward the points and fees thresholds as part of the finance charge, compensation paid by 
a mortgage broker to an employee of the mortgage broker (which is already included in the loan 
originator compensation paid by the consumer), and compensation paid by a creditor to its loan 
officers. Id. at 35,430.  
 38.  Explanatory Memorandum, National Consumer Credit Protection Bill 2009 (Cth) 81 
(Austl.). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See id. 
 41.  Commission, Consumer Legal Credit Centre (NSW), Inc., A Report to ASIC on the 
Finance and Mortgage Broker Industry, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENT COMMISSION, 
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problems largely stemming from minimal or no barriers to entry to the 
profession and barely any regulatory framework for those in the 
profession.42 Among the problems was the ability of brokers to operate 
without physical premises, overhead, or indemnity insurance, the general 
lack of accountability of brokers to their customers when those customers 
suffered damage as a result of the brokers’ actions, and the widespread 
use of “cold calling” by brokers to manipulate customers inside their own 
houses. Moreover, a scheme of “reverse competition” had developed in 
which groups of lenders battled to gain access to brokers and their 
distribution and customer networks. The commissions they offered 
brokers rose, causing an increase of cost to consumers as a result of this 
competition.43 Fraud was also found to be prevalent, as well as crimes 
such as creating false documents, excessive or undisclosed fees, and 
misrepresenting documents to clients ignorant of subtle differences 
between various financial instruments.44 The report also stated that 
statutory prohibitions against false or misleading representations were 
largely toothless, because they operate only after unfair business conduct 
has occurred.45 Aggrieved consumers were often forced to resort to the 
courts for redress, which, due to “inaccessibility, delays, daunting 
formality and high costs of the Court system,” offered a far from 
satisfactory solution.46  
The influence of mortgage brokers grew significantly in the early 
twenty-first century due to the minimal barriers to entry and minimal 
regulation of broker behavior. In 2005, the Office of Fair Trading 
reported the numerous ways in which broker fraud impacted the market, 
such as placing consumers in contracts calling for more than the 
consumer could pay, arranging loans for less than requested, or less than 
needed to purchase the property, or encouraging the consumer to lie about 
income or assets.47 As mortgage foreclosures began to rise, the 
mainstream banks and mortgage lenders began to feel the criticism and 
take the blame caused by the “fringe brokers.” Accordingly, they began 
to champion a new era of stricter nationwide regulation of the home-
mortgage lending industry. These odd bedfellows, consumer 
representatives and mainstream banks, joined to provide the national will 
to comprehensively regulate the business of extending credit to 
                                                                                                                     
6–7 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter ASIC Report], available at http://download.asic.gov.au/media/ 
1337558/Finance_mortgagebrokers_report.pdf. 
 42.  Id. at 19. 
 43.  Id. at 20. 
 44.  Id. at 80–84. 
 45.  Id. at 39. 
 46.  Id. at 54. 
 47.  National Finance Broking Regulation: Regulatory Impact Statement Discussion Paper, 
NSW OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, 13–15, (Mar. 2, 2015, 10:22 PM), available at http://www.fair 
trading.nsw.gov.au/pdfs/About_us/nationalfinancebrokingris.pdf. 
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consumers.48 Initial efforts sought to revamp the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code, in order to establish uniform state by state regulation. This 
project was well on its way when the GFC hit in 2007. Although Australia 
was not hit hard by the GFC, Australian lawmakers were well aware of 
the GFC and its underlying causes, particularly the subprime mortgage 
debacle in the United States. This only added to the enthusiasm for 
national consumer-credit reform.49 
On July 2, 2009, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
entered into an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) on National 
Consumer Law.50 To an American, this represents a breathtaking level of 
interstate cooperation, but the strong Australian desire for comprehensive 
national regulation helps explain it. In the Agreement, all Australian 
states and territories ceded to the Commonwealth the authority to regulate 
national consumer law, including consumer credit law. This led to the 
enactment of two substantial legislative acts: The Australian Consumer 
Law,51 and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act52 (Credit Act). 
The thrust of the Credit Act was fourfold, to: create a national licensing 
regime for parties engaging in credit activities, create a legal environment 
that permits only responsible consumer lending, create accessible dispute 
resolution processes, and provide a remedial regime for enforcement of 
these new requirements.53 
The requirement of responsible lending applies to all “credit activity,” 
which broadly includes participating in credit contracts, credit service 
(including connecting a consumer to a credit provider or acting as an 
intermediary), consumer leases, mortgages, guarantees and other 
activities later provided by regulation.54 The Credit Act adds a new 
category of persons to be licensed as credit providers that had not 
                                                                                                                     
 48.  Interview with Karen Cox, Director, Consumer Credit Legal Center of New South 
Wales, (Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Karen Cox Interview]. 
 49.  Id. To illustrate, Ms. Cox provided me with a joint media release published by a 
coalition of consumer lenders and representatives including Australian Bankers’ Association, 
Consumers Federation of Australia, Mortgage and Finance Association of Australia, Legal Aid 
(NSW and Queensland), Public Interest Law Clearing House (NSW) and several law firms. The 
release decries predatory lending by “fringe lenders” in the home loan market. It states that the 
coalition is seeking to engage state and federal governments on targeted reforms to deal urgently 
with such practices. The release is in my possession, as well as a similar release by Wizard Home 
Loans. Contact me at davis@law.ufl.edu. 
 50.  Council of Australian Government’s Meeting, COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 
at 7 (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.coag.gov.au/node/66. 
 51.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Austl.).  
 52.  Credit Act 2009, supra note 4. 
 53.  This fourfold thrust is evidenced in the organization of the Credit Act. Chapter 2 is 
entitled Licensing of persons who engage in credit activities. Chapter 3 is entitled Responsible 
lending conduct. Chapter 4 is entitled Remedies, and Chapters 5 and 6 regulate Administration, 
Compliance, and Enforcement.  
 54.  Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, § 204. 
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previously been regulated in any such fashion—assignees of debt:55 
 If the debt is legally assigned to the debt collector, the assignee 
becomes the person who legally owns the debt and to whom the 
consumer must make repayments. The assignee debt collector is 
now the credit provider, and so needs to be licensed. The original 
credit provider would no longer be considered the credit provider 
because the debt is no longer legally owed to them.56 
In this fashion, certain financial institutions and debt collectors not 
normally thought of as lenders, but mere purchasers of debt, would be 
within the ambit of the Credit Act and therefore compelled to obtain a 
credit license.57 
Responsible lending requires credit grantors and credit assistance 
providers to make a preliminary assessment as to whether the contract 
will be suitable for the consumer. Section 133 of the Credit Act states that 
a licensee must not enter a credit contract with a consumer or increase the 
credit limit of a credit contract with a consumer that is unsuitable for the 
consumer. The definition of what is “suitable” is stated quite broadly, and 
refined only slightly. The contract is unsuitable if it is likely the consumer 
will be unable to comply with the financial obligations under the contract, 
or could only comply with substantial hardship, or the contract does not 
meet the consumer’s requirements or objectives.58 Substantial hardship is 
not defined. It is presumed, however, in one specified circumstance: if 
the consumer could only comply with the financial obligations under the 
contract by selling the consumer’s principal residence.59 
In determining suitability, the creditor must make “reasonable 
inquiries”60 about the consumer’s requirements and objectives in relation 
                                                                                                                     
 55.  A person must not engage in a credit activity if the person does not hold a license. Id. 
§ 29(1). A person engages in credit activity if the person is a credit provider. Id. § 6(1) item (1)(a). 
Credit provider includes a person to whom the rights of a credit provider have been assigned. Id. 
§ 10(1)(b). 
 56.  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Do I Need a Credit License?, 
REGULATORY GUIDE 203, 14 (May 2013).  
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, § 130(1)(d). The credit would also be unsuitable if 
regulations prescribe unsuitability circumstances and the circumstances apply to the contract. Id. 
§ 133(2)(c). One such circumstance is stated explicitly in the statute: If the consumer could only 
comply by selling the consumer’s principal residence, it is presumed that compliance imposes a 
substantial hardship unless the contrary is proved. Id. § 133(3). 
 59.  Id. §§ 131(3), 133(3). Recall that one of the criticisms of American home mortgage 
lenders prior to the GFC is that loans were made solely against the collateral. See, e.g., id. These 
are similar ideas. In a sense, relying solely on the collateral assumes that on default, the residence 
will be sold to pay the debt.  
 60.  The reasonable inquiry requirement means inquiries about the consumer’s 
requirements and objectives, and financial situation. It also requires inquiries prescribed by the 
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to the contract and financial situation, and must take reasonable steps to 
verify the consumer’s financial situation.61 In making the determination, 
it is significant that the creditor is expected to take into account all 
information it would have had reason to believe if the creditor had made 
the required inquiries or verification.62 In other words, an Australian 
creditor is responsible for all the information it knew or had reason to 
know. 
The Act contemplates that the Regulations may prescribe 
circumstances in which a credit contract is unsuitable but the regulations 
have not provided any significant additional circumstances applicable to 
consumer credit contracts generally.63 Most of the additional 
circumstances bearing on suitability apply narrowly to unique types of 
credit, such as small or medium-amount credit or reverse mortgages.64  
One interesting feature of this statutory regime is that in determining 
suitability, the creditor must enquire into the consumer’s requirements 
and objectives in relation to the contract, but there seems to be no 
obligation to take steps to verify this information. Apparently, the 
consumer’s word is sufficient here. Moreover, there seems to be no 
obligation to second-guess the consumer’s judgment here. For example, 
if a man with a family sought financing to purchase a third motorcycle, 
the creditor would not be expected to determine whether the family was 
well cared for and the consumer had a legitimate need or desire for a third 
motorcycle. The creditor would be expected to determine only that the 
credit meets the consumer’s requirements and objectives.65 One wonders, 
in light of this, whether this obligation on creditors in making the credit-
                                                                                                                     
regulations and steps prescribed by the regulations. Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, § 130(1). The 
regulations have added an inquiry into the maximum credit limit the consumer requires, Reg. 
285A, but the regulations have not prescribed any steps to verify this information. 
 61.  Id. The statute recognizes that regulations may impose inquiry into additional 
information or additional steps to verify any matter prescribed by the regulations. Id.  
 62.  Id. § 133(4). 
 63.  Regulation 28HA National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010. Regulation 
28HA corrects an obvious oversight, adding that certain sections apply both to entering a credit 
contract and increasing the credit limit. Regulation 28528528J increases the investigation period 
in the case of real estate mortgages from 90 days to 120 days. Regulation 285A285A28JA corrects 
an oversight by adding to the list of inquiries that must be made the maximum credit limit the 
consumer requires. Regulation 28LC limits the effect of any circumstances the regulations might 
add under Credit Act 2009. Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, §§ 131(c)(2) & 133(c)(2) (stating that 
credit extended under those circumstances is unsuitable “unless the contrary is proved.”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Regs. National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 regs. 28XXL, 
28XXF. 
 65.  If the creditor lends the amount the consumer desires, would this not seem to meet the 
consumer’s requirements and objectives? Not always. One oft-repeated example, perhaps now 
apocryphal, is the story of the loan in the amount of the purchase price of a house, but when the 
broker/intermediary took out his fees, the proceeds received by the consumer were insufficient to 
purchase the house.  
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granting decision extends meaningfully beyond determination of the 
consumer’s ability to repay. 
In at least one respect, the required inquiry into the consumer’s 
“requirements and objectives” seems to assure one clear consumer 
benefit. It should deter creditors from selling things to consumers that 
they do not want or need, such as more credit than is necessary to achieve 
their specific objectives, or unneeded credit, liability, or casualty 
insurance.66 Recall the discovery that in the United States, numerous 
mortgage brokers were found to have steered borrowers who could have 
qualified for prime credit to subprime mortgages, which carried higher 
fees.67 Although the required determination of suitability does not 
explicitly prohibit extending credit that goes beyond meeting the 
consumer’s requirements and objectives, the explicit requirement that it 
meet those objectives strongly implies that the credit do no more than 
that. Nevertheless, the responsibility for formulating reasonable 
objectives is left to the consumer as long as the consumer is able to make 
the payments without substantial hardship. 
E. Comparing the Two Approaches to Home Mortgage Lending 
In the United States, the home mortgage lender must inquire into, 
verify in detail, and document a lengthy and precise list of facts bearing 
on ability to pay and make a good faith exercise of judgment in 
determining the consumer’s ability to repay. However, the lender can sail 
into the safe harbor and avoid these obligations by executing a Qualified 
Mortgage. While there are strict limits here on points and fees payable to 
intermediaries, there are no limits on what collateral products the lender 
may sell to the consumer as long as they do not exceed his or her ability 
to repay. 
In comparison, an Australian mortgage licensee, whether 
intermediary or lender, must make reasonable inquiry into and verify the 
consumer’s financial situation, and must ask about the consumer’s 
requirements and objectives. The lender must, without much guidance, 
determine that the consumer can make the payments without substantial 
hardship, including no danger of having to sell the house, and the lender 
must not include in the sale products that the consumer does not want or 
need. While there is very little precision or guidance provided lenders in 
making these determinations, there is also no safe harbor, and the 
                                                                                                                     
 66.  Indeed, this may have been the primary goal of the required inquiry into suitability. It 
originated from complaints under the prior law such as loans to purchase property where, due to 
charges and fees, the proceeds of the loan was insufficient to purchase the property, or credit limits 
higher than requested. Creditors were/are not expected to judge the wisdom of the consumer’s 
purpose. Karen Cox Interview, supra note 48.  
 67.  See supra text accompanying note 11. 
2015] REGULATING FOR THE FIRST TIME THE DECISION TO GRANT CONSUMER CREDIT 149 
 
consequence of civil or criminal liability of the Australian licensee may 
be more severe than for the American lender, because of the risk of losing 
the license to participate in the consumer credit industry. 
In both nations, the responsibility for making responsible borrowing 
decisions rests, as it always has, on the consumer, as long as the consumer 
is able to make the payments.  
II. REGULATING THE DECISION TO AUTHORIZE USE OF OR TO 
INCREASE THE CREDIT LIMIT ON A CREDIT CARD 
At first blush, one would think there is no need to regulate the decision 
to grant a credit card application because, unlike the 2007 American 
home mortgage market in which the persons making the credit granting 
decision had no stake in the consumer’s ability to repay, the issuer of a 
credit card actually extends the credit and directly shoulders the risk of 
nonpayment. However, in battling for market share, credit card issuers 
have been able to assume a great deal of risk, in some cases too much, 
because they were permitted to collect not only high rates of interest,68 
but also to collect a wide array of other fees and charges. Accordingly, in 
2009 lawmakers in both Australia and United States saw the need to 
require credit card companies to make the credit-granting or credit-
increase decision more thoughtfully. 
A. The Australian Approach 
The Australian requirement of responsible lending in extending 
consumer credit applies to all types of consumer credit activity, including 
credit cards and other forms of open-end or revolving credit. The same 
rules described above apply. Before granting use of the card or increasing 
the credit limit on an existing card, the creditor must make a 
determination of suitability by making reasonable inquiries into the 
consumer’s ability to meet the contractual obligations without substantial 
hardship. The creditor must also inquire as to whether the credit will meet 
the consumer’s requirements and objectives. In addition to these broad 
guidelines, there are no special provisions bearing on the credit-granting 
decision.  
The mandated inquiry into the consumer’s requirements and 
objectives should add little. The consumer’s objective is simply to have 
                                                                                                                     
 68.  In the United States, at least, state usury laws do not apply to credit card companies. In 
Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, (1978), the Supreme Court 
held that under the National Bank Act 12 U.S.C. § 85 federally chartered banks can charge the 
highest rate of its state of location. Immediately, South Dakota and a number of other states 
rescinded their usury laws, and card issuing national banks located in those states. 
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the use of a credit card and the attendant convenience it permits,69 
including the opportunity to build a credit history, avoid carrying cash, 
and protection against certain kinds of fraud and breach of warranty. 
Perhaps for a consumer that has ten credit cards, an eleventh credit card 
would be unsuitable. This would perhaps seem odd but unremarkable if 
the consumer has the ability to repay. 
B. The American Approach 
In 2009, Congress passed the CARD Act70 amending the Truth-in-
Lending Act requiring for the first time that in opening a credit card 
account or an open end credit plan the card issuer must consider the 
consumer’s ability to make the required minimum payments. In 
considering ability to make those payments, the issuer must use a 
reasonable method for estimating the minimum periodic payments,71 but 
this requirement may be met if the creditor estimates the payment using 
the prescribed method, called the “safe harbor.”72 In addition, Regulation 
Z requires card issuers to maintain policies and procedures to consider 
the consumer’s ability to repay.73 Reasonable policies and procedures are 
not defined, but examples are provided, which “include consideration of 
at least one of the following: The ratio of debt obligations to income; the 
ratio of debt obligations to assets; or the income the consumer will have 
after paying debt obligations.”74 So, the obligations (1) to consider ability 
to pay, and (2) to maintain reasonable policies and procedures can be met 
by calculating the minimum periodic payment according to the prescribed 
method, and by considering either the ratio of debt to income, the ratio of 
debt to assets, or disposable income after paying debt service.75 These are 
                                                                                                                     
 69.  Regulatory Guide 209 states: In relation to credit cards, the Explanatory Memorandum 
states that a 
credit card has no particular purpose and therefore there would be a limited 
requirement to understand the consumer’s requirements and objectives in this 
case. . . . However, we expect that [a creditor] would still make inquiries about 
the maximum limit the consumer requires on the card, as this is a key feature of 
the product that relates to the consumer’s requirements and objectives. 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 209.37 (2014). 
 70.  Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 111 Pub. L. No. 
24, 123 Stat. 852 (2009) [hereinafter CARD Act]. 
 71.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.51(a)(1)(i). 
 72.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.51(ii). 
 73.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.51. The closest the regulation comes to any such prohibition is to 
state the obvious, that “it would be unreasonable for a card issuer . . . .to issue a credit card of a 
consumer who does not have any income or assets.” Id. 
 74.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.51(a)(ii). 
 75.  Id. 
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ministerial acts that do not require the exercise of judgment. There is no 
requirement that the issuer determine that the consumer does or does not 
have the ability to repay, and there is no prohibition against issuing the 
card to a consumer that may be unable to pay. Perhaps this is explained 
by the fact that, unlike the 2007 home-mortgage industry, the decision to 
issue the card is made by the person that extends the credit and takes the 
risk of nonpayment. Congress seems to assume that the self-interest of 
the issuer will result in responsible decisions here. However, the self-
interest of the card issuer provides the consumer no protection if the 
issuer can collect limitless charges. Accordingly, in addition to the 
aspirational requirement that the creditor consider ability to repay, the 
2009 amendments to the Act placed numerous additional restrictions on 
the profit-generating practices in which the creditor could engage.76 By 
severely reducing issuer income from excessive non-interest charges, 
card issuers may be forced to make more careful credit granting 
decisions, giving up a little market share and perhaps protecting a few 
consumers from themselves. Rather than forcing card issuers to engage 
in responsible lending, by toothlessly requiring consideration, Congress 
may have imposed a self-correcting regime.  
In one respect, the 2009 amendments explicitly regulate the credit-
granting decision with great precision. Because of the perception that it 
was often too easy for young consumers to rack up unmanageable credit 
and damage their credit rating,77 consumers under the age of twenty-one 
cannot now get a credit card unless they can demonstrate an independent 
ability to repay the debt or unless they have a cosigner over the age of 
twenty-one that has the ability to repay it.78 
C. Comparing the Two Approaches to Granting Use of a Credit Card 
Aside from the special American focus on issuing credit cards to 
persons under twenty-one years of age, the differences here may be more 
a matter of form than substance. The requirement of responsible lending 
to persons over twenty-one years of age is stated differently. The 
                                                                                                                     
 76.  By requiring consumers to opt in for over limit fees for each charge that put the 
consumer over the credit limit, these have effectively been eliminated, and by requiring that 
penalty fees such as late fees be reasonable and proportional the size of late fees has declined. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Finds Card Act Reduced Penalty Fees and Made Credit Card 
Costs Clearer (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-finds-card-act-
reduced-penalty-fees-and-made-credit-card-costs-clearer/; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
CARD ACT REPORT 20 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_card-act-
report.pdf.  
 77.  Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 76. 
 78.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.51 (2013). No increase in credit limit is permitted unless the cosigner 
agrees in writing to assume liability for the increase. Id. Curiously, it is only here that granting 
credit is explicitly prohibited by either nation. 
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Australian card issuer must make an assessment of suitability, and deny 
the card to a consumer who cannot pay.79 The American card issuer must 
consider ability to repay, but is not required to deny the card to the 
consumer that fails the test. Once the American card issuer has been 
forced to consider ability to pay, the United States seems to depend on 
the self-interest of the issuer to act responsibly. Both nations have focused 
on limiting non-interest fees and charges, which, unlike interest, tend to 
be invisible to card applicants. Card issuers will now have to depend to a 
greater extent on interest income. Since they can no longer cover up a 
multitude of sins with limitless non-interest fees and charges, card issuers 
may be forced to make credit-granting decisions here more responsibly.  
III. PAYDAY AND OTHER SMALL-AMOUNT SHORT-TERM 
CONSUMER LOANS 
In both Australia and the United States, payday loans and their like 
have proven to be the most difficult type of consumer credit to regulate. 
Payday loans are typically designed as a way to bridge a cash shortage 
between pay or benefits checks. They share these three characteristics: 
(1) they are generally for small-amounts of money; (2) borrowers must 
repay them quickly;, and (3) the borrower must repay the full amount or 
give lenders access to repayment through a claim on the borrower’s 
deposit account.80 The length of the term is usually calculated to coincide 
with the next paycheck or other income source.81 Typically, the fee for 
this short-term money use is stated as a cash amount ranging from $10-
20 per 100.82 As long as the borrower expects to receive a pay or benefits 
check in the near future, usually there is no additional inquiry into the 
borrower’s credit-worthiness.83 In isolation, one-time loans of this sort 
are inoffensive. In fact, they are seen as playing a useful role, meeting the 
legitimate occasional needs of consumer borrowers, despite the fact that 
                                                                                                                     
 79.  The Credit Act states: “A licensee must not (a) enter a credit contract with a consumer 
who will be the debtor under the contract or (b) increase the credit limit of a credit contract with 
a consumer who is the debtor under the contract if the contract is unsuitable for the consumer . . .” 
Credit Act § 133 (2014). 
 80.  Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Finds Payday and Deposit Advance Loans can Trap 
Consumers in Debt (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/the-cfpb-finds-
payday-and-deposit-advance-loans-can-trap-consumers-in-debt/. 
 81.  Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Payday Loans and Deposit Advance Products, A White 
Paper of Initial Data Findings 6 (2013) [hereinafter CFPB Payday Loans Whitepaper], http://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf.  
 82.  In the United States, these loans are regulated by state law. Most states with payday 
lending storefronts set this maximum fee per $100, averaging about $15 per 100. Some states 
impose a sliding scale. Id. at 16. 
 83.  The creditor protects itself by insisting on immediate repayment or taking a claim on 
the borrower’s deposit account. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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the interest payable over a short period of time would seem quite high 
compared to typical consumer annual percentage rates.84 A fee of $15-20 
per 100 over 2 weeks equates to an annual percentage rate (APR) of 391% 
to 521%—but in the short term, it is only $20, a fair price for assistance 
in getting over the unexpected hump, particularly if the borrower’s poor 
credit rating would preclude getting the assistance from a more traditional 
lender. Payday lenders also fill a gap in the lending market, because banks 
typically do not consider lending amounts as small as $500.  
The problem with these types of loans is that frequently, at the end of 
the 2-week period, a consumer who has borrowed $300 at $20 per 100 
cannot come up with the required $360 in cash.85 It may be impossible to 
come up with the cash, or it may just be inconvenient to do so. Either 
way, the lender suggests that the consumer merely pay the $60 interest 
due, and “roll over” the loan for another 2 weeks.86 How cooperative, and 
understanding such a lender is! However, the principal amount is not 
reduced, and if the loan is rolled over multiple times, the consumer may 
well pay hundreds of dollars in fees and still owe the original $300. In 
such a case, the effective Annual Percentage Rate can reach breathtaking 
heights.87  
The societal policy question is whether there is anything wrong with 
this. After all, at each due date, the consumer makes the choice of whether 
to pay now or later. Paying now may sometimes be impossible, but 
usually it will be a matter of choosing not to pay or not to buy something 
else. Should this choice not be left to the consumer? Should it matter how 
many times these types of loans are rolled over, and for how long a period 
they remain outstanding? Is there some number of rollovers or some 
                                                                                                                     
 84.  See, e.g., Paige Martin Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2012). 
 85.  The cost of a payday loan is a fee which is typically based on the amount advanced and 
does not vary with the duration of the loan. The cost is usually expressed as a dollar fee per $100 
borrowed. Fees at storefront payday lenders generally range from $10 to $20 per hundred, though 
loans with higher fees are possible. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Whitepaper, Payday 
Loans and Deposit Advance Products 8 (Apr. 23, 2014). A payday loan is typically structured as 
a closed-end single payment loan with a due date that coincides with the borrower’s next payday 
or receipt of other income. Because the due date is timed in this manner, the loan term is typically 
two weeks. Id. 
 86.  Storefront payday loan contracts generally require borrowers to return to the storefront 
to pay the loan and associated fee by the due date. If a borrower is unable to repay the full amount, 
the lender may give her the option to roll over the loan balance by paying a fee, usually equal to 
the original finance charge, in order to extend the loan until her next payday. If the lender is 
unwilling or—because of restrictions in the state law—unable to directly roll over a loan, the 
borrower may instead repay the full amount due and then quickly take out a new loan. Id. at 9. 
 87.  To calculate the actual APR in such a case, one must know when the principal is paid 
off, so that the term of the loan can be known. Only then can the actual APR be calculated. For 
example, if the principal were paid off after 6 months (7 fortnights) the consumer will have paid 
$420 in interest for the use of $300 for 6 months. This equates to an APR of 521%. 
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effective APR that is just too high, so that society should take the choice 
away from the consumer? Should society attempt to distinguish between 
consumers who are “spiraling” deeper into debt and those that are barely 
keeping their noses above water? How could one measure the effect of 
such paternalism? Even if one could count the number of consumers 
saved from the spiral compared to the number not helped over the hump, 
which would probably be empirically impossible, how would one assess 
the meaning of such data? Does one consumer saved from the spiral equal 
two not helped over the hump?88 Studies in both nations show that too 
many are not saved. Instead, they languish.89 Accordingly, both nations 
recently decided that at least some nation-wide protection from these 
types of loans is needed and both have begun to regulate them. 
A. The Australian Regulation of Payday Loans 
On September 21, 2011, the Consumer Credit and Corporations 
Legislation Amendment 2011 (Enhancements Bill) was introduced into 
Parliament. The Bill proposed amendments to the Credit Act, including 
reforms to “small amount, high interest, short term loans,”90 which are 
colloquially known as payday loans. The reforms were spawned by a 
number of studies in both countries indicating that additional protections 
were needed.91  
As introduced, the Enhancements Bill contained a number of discrete 
prohibitions on the terms of payday loans, including a cap on fees and a 
prohibition on multiple lending and refinancing.92 In response, the 
submissions of the payday loan industry and the consumer welfare 
advocates were in stark opposition to one another.93 The industry, of 
                                                                                                                     
 88.  One might argue, for example, that a consumer not helped over the hump by expensive 
credit might have survived it anyway, as by working harder to earn the needed cash. The 
conservative argument against social welfare programs strikes a similar chord. But conservatives 
might not value any higher the saving of a consumer from deeper debt because the consumer 
might also save him/herself by working harder. Clearly, there is little to be gained in attempting 
this comparison. 
 89.  There would be no telling how many are helped. Presumably, those that do not engage 
in repeated roll-overs are helped, but of the repeaters, there would be no telling who was helped 
and who was made worse off.  
 90.  Paul Ali et al., The Politics of Payday Lending Regulation in Australia, 39 MONASH U. 
L. REV. 411, 411 (2014). “The reforms to payday loans were to be complemented by additional 
strategies aimed at reducing borrower reliance on payday loans, . . . such as microfinance and low 
and no interest community loan schemes.” Id. 
 91.  See generally id. at 416–18. 
 92.  In describing the contest over the substantive content of the bill as originally proposed, 
Ali et al. state, “[t]he second contested matter . . . was principally driven by industry opposition 
to the proposed cap on fees and interest rates and restrictions on multiple lending and refinancing.” 
Id. at 428. 
 93.  Id. 
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course, claimed without success that no regulation was needed at all,94 
but the industry’s greatest success lay in achieving significant reductions 
in the limitations on fees and repeat loans. The industry also succeeded 
in adding a significant degree of complexity, thus impenetrability, to the 
regulatory scheme.95  
The original Enhancements Bill permitted charging three allowable 
fees: an establishment fee reflecting reasonable costs of providing credit, 
a monthly fee, and a default fee. The establishment fee was originally 
capped at 10%, with reference to the cost of origination, and the monthly 
fee was capped at 2% (i.e., 24% per annum).96 However, due to 
aggressive lobbying by the payday lenders, these amounts were doubled 
in the final bill, and the reference to the costs of providing credit was 
removed, permitting a charge of twenty percent each time a loan is 
initiated (rolled over).97 The increases in these caps were required, 
according to the explanatory memorandum, for a “viable small amount 
lending industry to continue,” reflecting the legislature’s acceptance of 
the industry position.  
The original Enhancements Bill contained strict prohibitions on repeat 
and concurrent borrowing.98 The bill prohibited the lender from entering 
into a payday loan where the lender knew or was reckless as to whether 
the borrower was a debtor under another payday loan, or where some or 
all of the credit was to refinance an existing one.99 The industry strongly 
opposed these limits, arguing that the general responsible lending 
requirements were sufficient to protect consumers here, and consumer 
representatives vehemently objected.100 “However, the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee was persuaded . . . [that] a more appropriate response to 
consumer vulnerability would be to require short-term lenders to consider 
whether the proposed” loan is unsuitable under the circumstances.101 
Consequently, the prohibitions were removed and replaced with 
presumptions and obligations in relation to suitability under Chapter 3 of 
the Credit Act.102 If the consumer is either in default on a small amount 
contract or in the previous ninety days has been a debtor in two or more 
                                                                                                                     
 94.  Id. at 428–30. 
 95.  Id. at 445–50. 
 96.  Ali et al., supra note 90, at 435–36. 
 97.  Consumer Credit Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Act 2012, (Cth) sch. 4, item 
4, cl. 23A & item 12, cl. 31A(1), (2) & (3) (Austl.). 
 98.  Explanatory Memorandum, Consumer Credit and Corporations Legislation 
Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011, (Cth) 52 (Austl.).  
 99.  Consumer Credit Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Act 2012, (Cth) sch. 3 
(Austl.). 
 100.  Ali et al., supra note 90, at 440. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Consumer Credit and Corporations 
Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011, (Cth) 14. (Austl.).  
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small amount contracts, then it is presumed that the consumer could only 
meet the loan obligations with substantial hardship, and thus, the loan 
must be denied as unsuitable.103 Clearly, the presumption provides less 
protection for consumers than the outright prohibition of repeat and 
concurrent borrowing would have provided. On the other hand, because 
frequent rollovers are critical to the payday-lending business model, the 
outright prohibition would probably have sounded the end of most 
payday lending in Australia.  
One wonders how these presumptions are likely to affect the 
Australian payday loan industry. In applying for the first payday loan, 
there is no presumption and the loan will most likely be assessed as 
suitable. When asked about requirements and objectives, the consumer 
will probably have a good reason for applying (e.g., “My daughter is in 
the hospital,” or “Vinnie has threatened to break my knees if I don’t come 
up with the cash.”) and the expected paycheck is all the lender needs to 
know about regarding ability to repay. In rolling over a payday loan, the 
consumer’s only objective is to postpone full payment of the debt, and 
the agreement to permit rollover clearly meets this objective. The second 
rollover application raises the presumption of undue hardship and the 
creditor must deny the application unless it can rebut the presumption. 
What sorts of facts might suffice? Ordinarily, the ability to repay the third 
loan will be no different than the ability to repay the first, as long as the 
paycheck exceeds the amount of the loan plus the ten to twenty percent 
fee by a respectable amount. How much of a differential is respectable?104 
Arguably, because it is only a two-week loan, two weeks’ living expenses 
(room & board) should suffice. The consumer, who wants the rollover, 
will insist that the differential is sufficient, and the lender, who also wants 
the rollover, will probably agree. If future rollovers are expected, this 
view might seem short-sighted, but it is far from clear how or why the 
number of previous rollovers bears on the ability to repay the latest loan. 
The confusion is only magnified when one assumes the presumption 
exists because the consumer may have had a couple of payday loans two 
months earlier, either from the instant lender or another, within the 
statutory ninety day period. Having ignored the posted warnings105 and 
                                                                                                                     
 103.  Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, §§ 118, 123, 131, 133(3A). 
 104.  Perhaps National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010, (Cth) reg. 28S 
(Austl.); Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, § 133(3A) (providing a safe harbor). Under the authority 
of Credit Act 2009, section 133C(1), the regulations provide that “for consumers who receive at 
least 50% of their income under the Social Security Act,” the payment must not exceed 20% of 
the gross paycheck. For a consumer that is less dependent on such funds, this baseline would 
probably be a reliable source of rebuttal. 
 105.  National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg. 28XXA (Austl.) 
requires a warning on the licensee’s premises as set out in Schedule 7, stating: “Do You Really 
Need a Loan Today? It can be expensive to borrow small amounts of money and borrowing may 
not solve your money problems.” The warning also suggests a number of options to be tried before 
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seasonably paid off those previous loans seems to suggest that the 
consumer should have no trouble paying off the instant loan, which would 
rebut the presumption of substantial hardship.106 Given that both the 
consumer and the lender want the loan to be approved, it is hard to 
imagine many such loans being denied. Perhaps after a number of 
rollovers, the lender’s employee might ask the consumer who has 
dutifully paid the fortnightly fees, “Don’t you think you’ve rolled this 
loan over too many times? Why don’t you forego [something] and pay it 
off?” Perhaps not—in fear of getting a “talking to” by the boss, such as, 
“What’s wrong with you Charlie? Would you advise the goose to stop 
laying golden eggs?” 
Ali, McRae, and Ramsey argue that “rebuttable presumptions as 
opposed to strict prohibitions is problematic,”107 for a number of reasons. 
They state:  
[One] issue is the limited guidance available concerning key 
concepts under-pinning the rebuttable presumptions such as what 
constitutes substantial hardship and what constitutes unsuitability, 
and what is required to rebut these presumptions. In March 2013 
the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) recommended not 
introducing prescriptive requirements for lenders to assess 
affordability of loans. An OFT investigation of payday lenders in 
2012 found “significant underlying incentives” for lenders to 
assess loans as affordable, when in fact they are not.108 
With regard to repeat loans, ASIC Regulatory Guide 209 provides 
some precision. It provides an additional responsible lending requirement 
for small amount credit contracts. It states: 
[T]here are risks that the repeated or continued use of credit 
provided through this form of credit contract will result in 
consumers entering into multiple contracts where the overall level 
of indebtedness increases over time so that: 
(a) an increasing proportion of the consumer’s income will need to 
be used to meet the repayments; and 
(b) the capacity of the consumer to use the credit to improve their 
                                                                                                                     
borrowing, such as seeking free financial counseling, working out a payment plan with utilities 
providers, and asking for an advance against government benefits. Id. 
 106.  Although, paying off the prior loan and needing another loan shortly thereafter might 
be a good indicator that the consumer could not really afford to pay off the previous loan, and 
therefore cannot afford the new one. Having been a debtor in two or more such contracts in the 
previous 90 days is the presumption-creating measure chosen here.  
 107.  Ali et al., supra note 90, at 444. 
 108.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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standard of living is diminished. 
This requirement adds meaningfully to the presumption of undue 
burden resulting from repeat loans. Although a regulatory guide lacks the 
force of a statute or regulation, it is a clear statement of what ASIC will 
be looking for. If the creditor knows or should know that the consumer’s 
discretionary income is decreasing due to repeated loans, it will be much 
more difficult to rebut the presumption of undue burden.109 The 
importance of the fact that a creditor is statutorily responsible for 
information it should have discovered through reasonable inquiry should 
not be underestimated. Each time a payday loan is rolled over, the creditor 
is required to investigate and verify the consumer’s financial situation. It 
will be no excuse to say, “We didn’t know,” or “The debtor said nothing 
had changed.” The objectively demonstrable deterioration of the 
consumer’s financial situation will be strong evidence of unsuitability, 
making the three-loan presumption difficult to rebut.  
On the other hand, in seeking to rebut the presumption, there is 
nothing to prevent the lender from assuming the consumer will pay off 
the principal in partial payments over a number of rollover periods. In 
sum, it is far from clear that the Australian vision of responsible payday 
lending will cause any significant change in industry practices. 
B. The American Regulation of Payday Loans 
In 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a report concluding 
that predatory lending practices by payday lenders and other creditors 
near military bases were deliberately aimed at taking advantage of 
military personnel and their families.110 In 2007, Congress passed the 
Military Lending Act (MLA),111 and the Defense Department issued rules 
to implement the law, severely limiting payday lending to military 
personnel and their families.112 Because of national attitudes favoring 
                                                                                                                     
 109.  On the other hand, where the consumer has had two such loans in the previous ninety 
days, the creditor might rebut the resulting presumption of undue hardship by showing, in reliance 
on this guide, that the consumer has not suffered any decrease in discretionary income. At some 
point, this argument leads to the perverse conclusion that as long as the consumer’s financial 
situation is not worsening, the consumer needs no protection from this small loan cycle. But it is 
precisely by staying in the cycle that the consumer is most severely harmed. 
 110.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT 
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 21–22 (2006), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf. These findings were the result 
of an empirical survey done by Steven Graves and Christopher Peterson showing that payday 
lenders were deliberately targeting military bases across America. Steven M. Graves & 
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of 
“Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 832 (2005).  
 111.  The Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006). 
 112.  Press Release, Department of Defense Issues Final Military Lending Act Rule, DOD 
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protection of military personnel, there was virtually no political resistance 
to the MLA. In 2012, Congress amended the law by, among other things, 
giving the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) the authority 
to enforce it. The Bureau not only set out to enforce the MLA, but also 
commenced a comprehensive study of payday loans and deposit 
advances.113  In April 2013, the CFPB published the initial findings on 
payday loans and deposit advance products. The key findings focused on 
consumers’ sustained use of these loans. Some consumers use payday 
loans and deposit advances at relatively low to moderate levels. Thirteen 
percent of borrowers “took out only one to two loans over a twelve month 
period, and about one third took out six loans or less.”114 However, two-
thirds of the payday borrowers had seven or more loans in a year, mostly 
taken within fourteen days of the previous loan. Finding that a sizeable 
share of borrowers conduct transactions on a long-term basis suggested 
that they are unable to fully repay the loan plus other expenses without 
taking out a new loan shortly thereafter. “Thus they continually re-borrow 
and incur significant expense to repeatedly carry this debt from pay 
period to pay period . . . . [T]he high cost of the loan or advance may itself 
contribute to the chronic difficulty such consumers face in retiring the 
debt.” Also playing a material role in the harms experienced by 
consumers is that “lenders rely on their relative priority in the repayment 
hierarchy . . . without regard to whether the consumer can afford the 
loan,” which “trumps the consumer’s ability to organize and prioritize 
payments of debts and other expenses.”115 However, despite these 
findings, the Bureau concluded only that further inquiry is required into 
“the factors contributing to sustained use of these products by many 
consumers and the light to moderate use by others.”116 The Bureau is 
proceeding deliberately here, owing to its “objective of providing an 
evidence-based perspective on consumer financial markets, consumer 
                                                                                                                     
Press Release No: NR-289-15 (July 21, 2015). The release states that “This rule applies the 
protections of the Military Lending Act to all forms of payday loans . . .” Among other protections, 
the Act and Rules prohibit a creditor from requiring service members to provide a payroll 
allotment as a condition of obtaining credit, to refinance a payday loan, to secure credit using a 
post-dated check, to access to a bank account (other than at an interest rate of less than 36% 
MAPR). Taken together, these restrictions effectively prohibit making payday loans to military 
personnel. 
 113.  CFPB Payday Loans Whitepaper, supra note 81, at 1, 3. Deposit Advances are similar 
to payday loans. Payday loans are usually offered by non-depositary institutions. Depositary 
advances are offered by a small but growing number of depository institutions to certain deposit 
account holders who have recurring electronic deposits, such as direct deposit of their paychecks. 
The bank repays itself when the next qualifying deposit arrives. Id. at 6–7. 
 114.  Id. at 44. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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behavior, and regulations to inform the public discourse.”117 
While the CFPB continues to study the matter, the only current federal 
limitations on payday lending apply to the members of the military and 
their families.118 The prohibitions are extensive, prohibiting charge of 
interest in excess of 36% APR,119 and prohibiting roll over of any credit 
extended by the same creditor.120 However, the narrow definitions of the 
types of loans covered by the act have permitted lenders to sidestep the 
prohibitions by providing other types of loans to military personnel, 
leading to speculation that the MLA will need to be expanded.121 The 
question persists, if all military families need this protection, aside from 
the politics of the matter, it is not at all clear why other American families 
do not need at least some protections from payday lending. 
Of course, the states are free to regulate payday lending, and some of 
them do. Some impose disclosure obligations, some impose responsible 
lending codes, and some limit the allowable interest on payday loans.122 
In New York State, a strictly enforced interest rate cap has resulted in the 
total elimination of payday lending in that state.123 However, the rapid 
growth of online payday lending124 threatens to make it much more 
difficult for the states that choose to regulate payday lending to do so. 
The State of New York has recently obtained a $1.5 million penalty 
settlement plus refunds from an online lending institution for violating its 
interest rate cap,125 but such aggressive enforcement action requires a 
                                                                                                                     
 117.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING 2 (MAR. 25, 
2014), available at files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_ cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf. The 
quoted statement is taken from the cover page of the Data Point publication. In this publication, 
the Bureau describes some of the findings in a recent study. 
 118.  The scope of the MLA reaches broadly to include extensions of consumer credit to a 
member of the armed forces on active or reserve duty or a dependent of the member. 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 987(i)(1), 987(i)(2) (2014). 
 119.  10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2014). 
 120.  10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(1) (2014). 
 121.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, Service Members Left Vulnerable to Payday 
Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013, 8:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/service-
members-left-vulnerable-to-payday-loans/. Loans not covered included “loans for more than 
$2,000, loans that last for more than 91 days, and auto-title loans with terms longer than 181 
days.” Id.; see also John L. Culhane, Jr., Proposal to Expand Military Loan Act Coverage Appears 
Likely, CFPB MONITOR (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/11/26/proposal-to-
expand-military-loan-act-coverage-appears-likely/. These problems were solved by the July 21, 
2015 amendments to the Military Lending Act Rule. See supra note 112. 
 122.  Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 875–77 
(2007). 
 123.  Karen E. Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis 
of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 623. (2010). 
 124.  CFPB Payday Loans Whitepaper, supra note 81, at 10. “[T]he online channel is steadily 
growing and some industry analysts believe it may eventually overtake storefront loan value.” Id.  
 125.  Karen Freifeld, Online Lender Settles New York Lawsuit Amid Crackdown on Massive 
‘Payday’ Loans, REUTERS U.S. ED. (Jan. 23, 2014, 10:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
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substantial financial commitment that many states would not be willing 
politically or able financially to make. Meaningful regulation of interstate 
online lenders will probably require a federal effort. Perhaps the rapid 
growth in payday lending will provide the impetus for CFPB 
intervention. 
C. Comparing Australian to American Regulation of Payday Loans 
There is very little to compare here at the national level. Australia has 
placed great reliance on the presumption that three payday loans in a 
ninety-day period creates a presumption of undue hardship, but it is far 
from clear that this will impact business of usual. In the United States, 
payday lending to military personnel has been restricted.126 Otherwise, in 
the United States, the CFPB is actively studying the matter.127 As yet, 
however, no national regulation of payday loans has appeared.128 The 
responsibility here remains with the states, and both the degree of 
regulation and the level of enforcement effort here varies dramatically 
from state to state.129  
In reality, any attempt to regulate the decision to grant a payday loan 
may be futile. The nature of the business is such that as long as the 
borrower expects a paycheck or a benefits check, the loan will be made. 
The societal question is whether to permit such loans at all. If so, the 
challenge will be to decide how to regulate the terms such that the 
incentive to grant these loans is not destroyed, yet the likelihood of 
excessive rollovers is curtailed. This reality must be recognized: the 
                                                                                                                     
2014/01/24/usa-onlinelender-lawsuit-idUSL2N0KY03N 20140124. 
 126.  See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 875–
76 (2007). 
 127.  See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING 2 
(2014), available at files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf. 
 128.  On March 26, 2015, the CFPB issued a press release stating that it is considering 
proposing rules that would end “payday debt traps,” including payday loans, vehicle title loans, 
deposit advance products and certain high-cost installment loans and open-end loans. Two 
approaches are being considered, requiring lenders to determine at the outset that the consumer 
can repay the loan, or alternatively at the choice of the lender, the lender would be required to 
provide affordable repayment options, and the number of loans a consumer could take out in a 
row over the course of a year would be limited. Press Release, Mar. 26, 2015, 
www.consumerfinance.gov/press-releases. 
 129.  In an interesting recent development aimed at assisting the states in enforcing their 
restrictions on payday lending, on August 4, 2015, the CFPB issued a press release stating that it 
had filed a lawsuit against numerous “offshore payday lenders” that originate and collect payday 
loans over the internet in 50 states, including states such as New York where those loans are void 
because they violate usury caps and licensing requirements. The complaint alleges that the 
defendants have violated the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s 
prohibition against unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices. Press Release, Aug. 4, 2015, 
www.consumerfinance.org/ Press-releases. 
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viability of this industry turns on the expectation of frequent excessive 
rollovers. If this is a necessary evil, borne of the sad fact that too many 
consumers have insufficient income to make ends meet, then the industry 
must be permitted to exist. The worthy societal goal should then be to 
improve the lot of necessitous consumers, either by reducing poverty or 
by providing alternative sources of credit. But these are lofty goals that 
are far from within immediate reach. 
IV. COMPARING ENFORCEMENT REGIMES: THE KEY TO IT ALL 
Regulation of human conduct is difficult. It is particularly difficult in 
cultures like those of the United States and Australia in which 
independence, creativity, and competitiveness are highly prized. It is self-
evident that the key to the effectiveness of the regulations lies in the 
enforcement regulations. In comparing the instant regimes regulating the 
decision to grant consumer credit, there are of course similarities, but 
there are also substantial differences. Australia has imposed one of the 
most progressive consumer protection regimes in the world.130 If the 
United States is to significantly alter the consumer-lending culture, it 
would do well to keep a close eye on the success of the Australian 
experience.  
A. Australian Enforcement Mechanisms 
1. Licensing 
At the heart of the Australian approach is the comprehensive national 
licensing regime. One of the lengthiest and most detailed parts of the 
Credit Act is Chapter 2, Licensing of Persons Who Engage in Credit 
Activities. The key elements are that: 
It requires persons who engage in credit activities to, initially, be 
registered with ASIC, and to hold an Australian Credit License 
(ACL);131 
 
It imposes entry standards for registration and licensing, and 
enables ASIC to refuse an application where the person does not 
meet those standards;132 
                                                                                                                     
 130.  See, e.g., Credit Act 2009, supra note 4. 
 131.  Id. § 29(1). 
 132.  ASIC must not grant a license to a person unless “ASIC has no reason to believe that 
the person is likely to contravene the obligations under the statute,” or “ASIC has no reason to 
believe that the person is not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities.” Credit Act 
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It requires registered persons and licensees to meet certain ongoing 
standards of conduct while they engage in credit activities; and133 
 
It provides ASIC the power to suspend or cancel a license or 
registration, or to ban an individual from engaging in credit 
activities.134 
The power of ASIC to control entry of a person into or to expel a 
person from the consumer credit industry provides enormous incentive to 
toe the line. This requires not only that the creditor operate within the 
responsible lending rules, but also to comply with the extensive record 
keeping, trust account maintenance, auditing compliance, and reporting 
requirements.135 It is also significant that ASIC may exercise this power 
across the nation. It will not be possible for a person to get into difficulty 
in one state, and then move to another to set up shop anew. 
2. Forums, Remedies and Enforcers 
A key feature of the Credit Act is the improved access to dispute 
resolution in terms of location, procedural simplicity, and lower cost.136 
Credit providers and credit servicers are required to have an internal 
dispute resolution process, and are also required to maintain membership 
in an ASIC-approved External Dispute Resolution Scheme.137 The 
membership fees sustain the two ASIC-approved External Dispute 
Resolution services, the Financial Ombudsman Service,138 and the Credit 
Ombudsman Service.139 The service is free to the consumer, and once a 
dispute action is lodged, all enforcement efforts are stayed until the 
dispute is resolved.140 The ombudsman will normally operate initially as 
                                                                                                                     
2009, supra note 4, § 37(1)(b), (c). ASIC must also not grant a license to a person contrary to a 
banning order or disqualification, or of a state or territorial order prohibiting the person from 
engaging in credit activity under the law of the state or territory. Id. § 40. 
 133.  Id. §§ 47–53. 
 134.  Id. ch. 2, pt. 22, div. 6, § 54. 
 135.  See id. pt. 255, §§ 91–105. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. div. 5, § 47. 
 138.  About Us—What We Do, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www. 
fos.org.au/about-us/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).  
 139.  About Us –Our Role, CREDIT OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www. cio.org.au/about/our-
role/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).  
 140.  For example, the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) operates under the ASIC-
approved Term of Reference (TOR), About Us—Terms of Reference, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN 
SERVICE, http://www.fos.org.au/about-us/terms-of-reference/ (last visited Feb.18, 2015). TOR s. 
7.3 provides that FOS may require a party to do anything that it considers may assist in its 
consideration of the dispute. Terms of Reference, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE 16 (Jan. 1, 
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a mediator, but the ombudsman is also empowered to render a final 
determination.141 If neither process resolves the dispute, consumers retain 
access to the courts to seek redress.142 Not only is the consumer entitled 
to seek redress in court, ASIC and in some instances other interested 
parties are entitled to participate in a dispute.143  
The Credit Act provides a wide array of remedies against an offending 
credit or credit assistance provider. ASIC may seek a declaration of 
contravention of a civil penalty, which carries a pecuniary penalty. 
Recognizing that the penalty amounts need to be substantial to 
sufficiently deter inappropriate behavior144 the penalties can be severe. 
For example, a licensee that enters a credit contract that is unsuitable for 
the consumer may incur a civil penalty of 2,000 penalty units, which 
amounts to a maximum of $220,000 for individuals and $1,100,000 for 
corporations, partnerships or multiple trustees.145 In addition to civil 
penalties, some kinds of misconduct are defined as “offenses” for which 
ASIC may apply for a court order imposing a criminal penalty or 
imprisonment or both.146 So, depending on the failure to comply, a 
licensee may be charged with both civil and criminal penalties.147 
In addition to penalties, for which only ASIC is empowered to seek 
an order,148 on application of ASIC or any other person, the court is 
empowered to grant an injunction.149 Any person that has suffered 
damage may seek compensation for any loss or damage.150 ASIC may 
apply for damages on behalf of the consumer with the consumer’s 
consent,151 and the consumer may seek an order varying the contract, 
                                                                                                                     
2014) http://www.fos.org.au/custom/files/docs/terms-of-reference-from-1-january-2010-as-ame 
nded-1-january-2014.pdf. TOR s 13.1 provides that once a disputed is lodged, the creditor must 
not take any action to recover the debt while FOS is dealing with the dispute. Id. at 27. 
 141.  Id. at 19–20. 
 142.  Id. at 20. 
 143.  For example, in section 177(1), ASIC “or any other person” may apply for an 
injunction. Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, § 177(1). 
 144.  Id. §§ 165–67.  
 145.  Id. §§ 118, 167(3)(b), 169. “A penalty unit has the meaning given by section 4AA of 
the Crimes Act 1914.” Id. § 5. Further, persons “involved in” contravention of a civil penalty, 
such as aiding and abetting, inducing the contravention, or being in any way knowingly concerned 
in it, are likewise taken to have contravened it. Id. § 169. 
 146.  See, e.g., id. § 33(2) (stating that giving information or a document to another in the 
course of engaging in a creditor activity that is materially false or misleading is an offense 
punishable by a criminal penalty of 100 penalty points or two years in prison, or both). 
 147.  Id. § 173. 
 148.  Id. Credit Act 2009, section 166, which is recoverable as a debt due the 
Commonwealth. Id. § 166(4). 
 149.  Id. § 177. 
 150.  Id. § 178. 
 151.  Id. § 178(2), (3). 
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enforcing some or part of the contract or declaring the contract void.152  
I asked Karen Cox,153 Director of the Consumer Credit Legal Center 
of New South Wales (CCLC), “Now that the Credit Act has been in force 
for nearly four years, how is it going? Are Consumer Lenders complying? 
Is the culture of consumer lending changing? Have any creditors lost their 
licenses? Is Internal or External Dispute Resolution working?” She told 
me many things. 
The mainstream lenders are being very compliant, sometimes they are 
even more hesitant to lend than the statute requires. They are actively 
putting procedures in place that will assure compliance. Cases against 
mainstream lenders are decreasing. There have been few disputes with 
mainstream lenders indicating a lack of responsible lending. So far so 
good, but we are still in the honeymoon. 
The disputes that have so far appeared have all involved the payday 
lenders154 and consumer lessors.155 When CCLC initiates a dispute 
against a payday lender, Ms. Cox reports that the lender typically first 
offers to lower the payments, which we reject. Then the lender offers to 
waive the debt, which may not be acceptable either, depending on the 
facts and the client’s instructions. Usually the lender has failed to comply 
with the responsible lending obligations, and we insist that the lender 
return all funds the consumer has paid in excess of the benefit received 
from the loan. The lender usually settles, denying liability for any breach 
of the Act, and because our services and those of the External Dispute 
Resolution service are free, it has cost the consumer nothing.  
The reason the lenders comply with our demands is that the processes 
                                                                                                                     
 152.  Id. § 179(2). The Consumer also has remedies against an unlicensed provider, including 
preventing the provider from profiting from the contract (disgorgement), compensation for 
damage suffered, and prevention of any damage likely to be suffered. Id. § 180. 
 153.  Interview with Karen Cox, Director, Consumer Credit Legal Center of New South 
Wales, in Sydney Australia (Feb. 28, 2014). 
 154.  In November 2011, ASIC published Report 264 Australian, Review of micro lenders’ 
responsible lending conduct and disclosure obligations. The Report found that in the first six 
months of the new credit regime the industry has changed its practices to respond to the new 
obligations. AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, REPORT 264: REVIEW OF 
MICRO LENDERS’ RESPONSIBLE LENDING CONDUCT AND DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS 5–6 (2011). 
However, ASIC found numerous instances in which verification of consumer income and 
expenses was largely absent and where there was no information showing how the lender 
calculated that a consumer would be able to make the payments. Id. at 7. “There were occasions 
where the files reviewed contained a figure with little or no information substantiating how it was 
calculated.” Id. at 19. ASIC also found numerous other shortcomings, stating generally this 
“increases the risk of micro lenders not being able to demonstrate that they have assessed whether 
the consumer would be able to repay the proposed credit contract without substantial hardship.” 
Id. 
 155.  Consumer leases fall within the definition of consumer loan where it is contemplated 
that on completion of the lease payments, the consumer has the right to take title to the leased 
goods. These are regarded as a sale by installments. Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, sch. 1, § 9. 
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they have followed have been sorely inadequate and they have left the 
consumer with insufficient funds to live on. These lenders have had no 
colorable defense. Admittedly, this is low-hanging fruit. Recently one 
ombudsman, the first to do so, issued a final determination that the lender 
had breached the statute by failing to assess ability to repay. The cases 
have not yet developed to a point that speaks to the question of what it 
takes to rebut the three-loan presumption. Once some payday lenders 
establish and follow a process to determine ability to repay, the answers 
to this question will begin to emerge.  
Some industry participants have been barred from practicing, and 
some have been banned, losing their licenses. Most of these have been 
credit assistance providers, meaning brokers. Again, this has been low-
hanging fruit. In these cases the brokers have engaged in fraud—out-and-
out lying. To date, no one has lost a license for failure to assess suitability. 
I asked: What is the most important part of the new statutory scheme. 
Her poignant response: “The requirement of responsible lending would 
be pointless without licensing and external dispute resolution.” 
In sum, much has been achieved. Mainstream lenders are so far taking 
responsible lending very seriously, but the payday lenders and consumer 
lessors are operating largely as they had before the Credit Act. 
Occasionally they have to settle with a consumer that lodges a dispute, 
but it is likely that these creditors will continue to resist change until 
aggressive enforcement leaves them no choice. Recently, ASIC has 
brought an action against one of the primary Australian payday 
lenders.156 The result here could be a watershed in the Australian payday 
lending industry. 
B. American Enforcement Mechanisms 
1. Licensing 
There is no federal licensing regime in the United States, nor is there 
any interstate licensing of persons engaged in interstate consumer credit 
activity. Intrastate licensing has long been left to the states. Moreover, the 
likelihood of change here is minimal. The extraordinary example of 
interstate cooperation among the Council of Australian Governments is 
hardly to be expected to occur in the United States.157 With the advent of 
the GFC in 2007, Americans looked in the mirror and found the state-to-
                                                                                                                     
 156.  ASIC Takes Civil Action Against the Cash Store, AUSTRALIA SECURITIES & 
INVESTMENT COMMISSION (Sept. 11, 2013), http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-
media-release/2013-releases/13-257mr-asic-takes-civil-action-against-the-cash-store/.  
 157.  In the current political climate in which “red” states are staunchly opposed to 
empowering the federal government, one cannot imagine a unanimous agreement in which the 
states ceded to the federal government the authority to regulate any form of business activity. 
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state regulation of the participants in home mortgage markets to be spotty 
at best, and deplorable at worst. For example, Florida was one of the 
states whose housing markets were most severely hurt by the GFC. In 
2008, the Miami Herald reported that the Financial Regulation 
Commissioner’s office had licensed “more than 10,000 ex-felons [to] 
work as [mortgage] brokers since 2000, some of whom defrauded 
customers out of an estimated eighty-five million dollars.”158 Further, in 
2007, the Chief Inspector General conducted a review ordered by the state 
cabinet, reporting that “231 felons whose past crimes kept them from 
acquiring mortgage brokering licenses, began writing mortgages as loan 
originators,” which did not require a license.159 
2. Forums, Remedies, Enforcers 
The forum in which American disputes are to be resolved is primarily 
the courtroom. While alternative dispute resolution processes are 
possible, they are perceived, as the name implies, as the alternative. In 
fact, contractual mandatory arbitration clauses are prohibited.160 The 
consumer and the Bureau are the parties primarily contemplated as 
enforcing the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Federal Trade Commission is 
also empowered to enforce the Act.161 All three, consumer, Bureau, and 
FTC, can seek to impose civil liability for violation of the Truth-in-
Lending Act as provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1640. But the remedies available 
here are comparatively modest.162 In contrast, the enforcement powers of 
the Bureau are much more expansive. The Bureau has broad investigative 
                                                                                                                     
 158.  Catherine Dolinski, Review: State Was Lax on Mortgage Writers, TAMPA TRIB. (Sept. 
17, 2008), http://tbo.com/news/metro/2008/sep/17/me-review-state-was-lax-on-mortgage-writer 
s-ar-123212/. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) (2014). 
 161.  Any violation of a regulation issued by the Bureau pursuant to (l)(2) shall be treated as 
a violation of a rule promulgated under § 57(a) of the FTCA as an unfair and deceptive act or 
Practice. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(q) (2014). 
 162.  15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2014), provides that any creditor that fails to comply with any 
requirement imposed under the Act is liable in the amount of: (1) actual damages; (2) in a 
transaction secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $400 or greater than $4,000; (3) 
costs plus attorney’s fees; and (4) in certain cases including violation of the minimum standards 
for determining ability to repay, “the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer, 
unless the creditor demonstrates that the failure to comply [was] not material.” § 1640(a). In 
addition to laying out the levels of civil liability attendant to violations of the Act, Section 1640 
also provides the key defense: a creditor or assignee may not be held liable if it can prove that 
“the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding [] 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” Examples of bona fide 
errors include clerical, calculation, computer malfunction, and printing errors, but an error of legal 
judgment is not a bona fide error. § 1640(c). Criminal liability may be imposed for willful 
knowing violation or failure to comply with the Act, resulting in a fine of up to $5,000, 
imprisonment for up to one year, or both. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (2014). 
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and administrative discovery powers.163 It may hold hearings and 
adjudication proceedings,164 and it may litigate in court.165 The potential 
relief available is nearly limitless. In addition to rescission, reformation, 
restitution, disgorgement, and imposition of damages and costs, the 
Bureau can impose civil money penalties against any person that violates 
federal consumer financial law.166 The penalties fall into in three tiers. In 
tier one, for any violation, a penalty of up to $5,000 for each day the 
violation continues.167 In tier two, for any reckless violation, a penalty of 
$25,000 per day may be imposed.168 In tier three, for any knowing 
violation, a penalty of $1,000,000 per day may be imposed.169 Providing 
some comfort, the statute explicitly identifies a number of mitigating 
factors to be taken into account in assessing any of these penalties, which 
include the size of the entity, the gravity of the violation, severity of risk 
or loss to the consumer, history of previous violations, and any other 
matters justice may require.170 
C. Comparing Australian and American Enforcement Regimes 
The differences in the potential financial severity of violating the 
American and Australian Credit Acts are not striking. Because the vast 
majority of such lenders is likely to be made up of corporate lenders, 
potential liability could exceed $1,000,000 for an Australian creditor that 
makes an unsuitable loan, and there is no good-faith defense; liability is 
strict. An American corporate mortgage lender that fails properly to 
assess ability to repay also risks liability in the millions of dollars, but the 
mitigating factors will play an important role here. If the corporation 
maintains procedures adapted to avoid the error, it may escape severe 
liability by proving that the error was not intentional and bona fide.171 
American assignees of mortgage loans are at far less risk than 
Australian assignees. Australian assignees are licensees falling within the 
scope of the Credit Act.172 In the United States, assignees are liable only 
                                                                                                                     
 163.  12 U.S.C. § 5562 (2014). 
 164.  12 U.S.C. § 5563 (2014). 
 165.  12 U.S.C. § 5564 (2014). 
 166.  12 U.S.C. § 5565 (2014). 
 167.  12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2)(A) (2014). 
 168.  12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2)(B) (2014). 
 169.  12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2)(C) (2014). 
 170.  12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3) (2014). 
 171.  It would not be surprising if the undefined mitigating factor “any other matters justice 
may require” were to borrow from the Truth-In-Lending Act the mitigating conduct of 
maintaining procedures adapted to avoid the error. See 12 U.S.C. § 5562 (2014); 12 U.S.C. § 
5565(c)(3). 
 172.  See text accompanying 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2014). 
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for violations apparent on the face of the disclosure statement.173 Since a 
failure to assess ability to repay is not likely to appear in this fashion, 
assignee risk here is minimal. 
In both countries, mainstream mortgage lenders are likely to place 
great emphasis on compliance with the responsible lending requirement, 
and mortgage brokers have been severely reined in. The days when the 
maker of the lending decision has no stake in the consumer’s ability to 
pay may be gone, not because a consumer default is harmful to the 
mortgage company, but because of the risk of sanctions for making a loan 
that the consumer cannot repay.  
In the credit card realm, the prospects are good that creditors will be 
somewhat more responsible than they had been in assessing consumer 
ability to repay. In part, this is because of the threat of sanctions for failing 
to assess ability to repay. A second motivating force is that both nations 
have constrained the issuer’s ability to cover poor credit-granting 
decisions with myriad fees and charges. They will be forced to compete 
primarily on the basis of interest rate, which many consumers are aware 
of and understand. If competition on that basis forces rates lower, issuers 
will have to approve credit card applications more carefully.  
In the world of payday lending, the irresistible force is the lender’s 
need for consumers to borrow repeatedly. The immovable object is the 
consumer representatives’ desire to protect consumers from spiraling 
more deeply into debt, which frequently accompanies payday borrowing. 
Absent better credit alternatives, and assuming poverty will not be 
eradicated, payday lenders may occupy a right balance. Perhaps in its 
Regulatory Guide 209, ASIC has found a pearl. If with successive loans, 
the consumer is left with less and less discretionary income, the spiraling 
is objectively apparent.174 At that point, the lender’s determination that 
the consumer has the ability to pay, should become highly suspect, and 
the unsuitability of the loan much more clear. Sanctions in such a scenario 
should be easy to impose. 
How effective a motivator of the risk of sanctions will be will depend 
on the effectiveness of the enforcement regime. Australian consumer 
representatives have two powerful enforcement devices that Americans 
lack: Licensing175 and free external dispute resolution.176 Government 
funding of enforcement activities is, of course, critical. But assuming 
                                                                                                                     
 173.  Id. 
 174.  The Act holds creditors responsible for the knowledge they should have acquired if 
they had engaged in a reasonable inquiry, and Regulatory Guide 209 highlights the importance of 
the overall increase of indebtedness over time. Knowledge that the debtor’s indebtedness is 
increasing over time provides objectively verifiable proof that the debtor is spiraling deeper into 
debt. 
 175.  Credit Act 2009, supra note 4, § 29(1). 
 176.  Id. div. 5, § 47. 
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both nations provide comparable levels of funding, enforcement in 
Australia should be much more effective than in the United States. The 
United States should take heed. 
CONCLUSION 
How successful these nations will be in altering the culture of their 
consumer-credit industries remains to be seen. Large institutional lenders 
will probably at least set up procedures designed to protect against 
extending unsuitable or unaffordable credit to consumers. Credit cards 
may be issued to fewer consumers who lack the ability to manage them 
responsibly. Payday loans, on the other hand, may prove to be much more 
difficult to rein in. But the game is new. Both nations are taking first steps 
here, and the methods for regulating credit granting decisions are certain 
to evolve. National commitment of resources to the effort will be crucial, 
and if that commitment remains steady, the bold decision to depart from 
freedom of contract and to regulate the decision to grant credit to a 
consumer may prove worthwhile. 
